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Abstract—The problem of securing a network coding
communication system against a wiretapper adversary is
considered. The network implements linear network coding
to deliver n packets from source to each receiver, and
the wiretapper can eavesdrop on µ arbitrarily chosen
links. A coding scheme is proposed that can achieve the
maximum possible rate of k = n − µ packets that are
information-theoretically secure from the adversary. A
distinctive feature of our scheme is that it is universal:
it can be applied on top of any communication network
without requiring knowledge of or any modifications on
the underlying network code. In fact, even a randomized
network code can be used. Our approach is based on
Rouayheb-Soljanin’s formulation of a wiretap network as
a generalization of the Ozarow-Wyner wiretap channel
of type II. Essentially, the linear MDS code in Ozarow-
Wyner’s coset coding scheme is replaced by a maximum-
rank-distance code over an extension of the field in which
linear network coding operations are performed.
I. INTRODUCTION
The paradigm of network coding [1]–[3] has provided
a rich source of new problems that generalize traditional
problems in communications. One such problem, intro-
duced in [4] by Cai and Yeung, is that of securing a
multicast network against a wiretapper adversary.
Formally, consider a multicast network with unit ca-
pacity edges implementing linear network coding over
the finite field Fq . Each link in the network is assumed
to carry a packet of m symbols in Fq. We assume that
the maxflow from source to each receiver is at least n
and that the network code is feasible for the multicasting
of n packets, that is, each receiver is able to recover
the n packets originated at the source. Now, suppose
there is a wiretapper that can listen to transmissions on
µ arbitrarily chosen links of the network. The secure
network coding problem is to design a network code and
an outer encoder at the source such that a message can
be transmitted from the source to each receiver without
leaking any information to the wiretapper (i.e., security
in the information-theoretic sense).
The work of Cai and Yeung [4] shows that a solution
to this problem exists if the message consists of at most
k = n − µ packets and q is sufficiently large. Their
solution involves changing the network code such that
certain security conditions are met and requires a field
of size at least
(
ℓ
µ
)
, where ℓ is the number of links in
the network. Feldman et al. [5] simplified the conditions
in [4] and showed that it is possible to achieve security
by carefully designing the outer code, while leaving the
network code unchanged. They also show that, if a linear
outer code is used and the network topology is arbitrary,
then there are instances of the problem where a very
large field size is necessary to achieve capacity.
Recently, Rouayheb and Soljanin [6] have shown that
the problem of secure network coding can be regarded as
a network generalization of the Ozarow-Wyner wiretap
channel of type II [7], [8]. Their observation provides
an important connection with a classical problem in
information theory and yields a much more transparent
framework for dealing with network coding security.
In particular, they show that the same technique used
to achieve capacity of the wiretap channel II—a coset
coding scheme based on a linear MDS code—can also
provide security for a wiretap network. Unfortunately, in
their approach, the network code has to be modified to
satisfy certain constraints imposed by the outer code.
Note that, in all the previous works, either the network
code has to be modified to provide security [4], [6], or
the outer code has to be designed based on the specific
network code used [5]. In all cases, the field size required
is significantly larger than the minimum required for
conventional multicasting.
The present paper is motivated by Rouayheb and
Soljanin’s formulation of a wiretap network and builds
on their results. Our main contribution is a coset coding
scheme that neither imposes any constraints on, nor
requires any knowledge of, the underlying network code.
In other words, for any linear network code that is feasi-
ble for multicast, secure communication at the maximum
possible rate can be achieved with a fixed outer code. In
particular, the field size can be chosen as the minimum
required for multicasting. An important consequence of
our result is that the problems of information transport—
designing a feasible network code—and security against
a wiretapper can be completely separated from each
other. Such a feature of our scheme allows it to be
seamlessly integrated with random network coding.
The essence of our approach is to use a “nonlin-
ear” outer code that is, however, linear over an ex-
tension field Fqm . Taking advantage of this extension
field, we can then replace the linear MDS code in
Ozarow-Wyner coset coding scheme by a maximum-
rank-distance (MRD) code, which is essentially a linear
code over Fqm that is optimal in the rank metric. Codes
in the rank metric were studied by a number of authors
[9]–[12] and have been recently proposed for error
control in random network coding [13], [14]. Here, we
show that the fact that the wiretapper observes a linear
transformation of the transmitted symbols is exactly what
suggests the use of a rank-metric code.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II we review the models of a wiretap channel II
and a wiretap network, together with their corresponding
security conditions. In Section III we review rank-metric
codes and present our solution to the security problem
in a wiretap network. In Section IV, we provide a brief
discussion of our main result and, in Section V, we
present our conclusions.
II. WIRETAP MODEL
A. Wiretap Channel II
Consider a communication system consisting of a
source, a destination and a wiretapper. The source pro-
duces a message S =
[
S1 S2 · · · Sk
]T
, where
the symbols S1, . . . , Sk are drawn from an alpha-
bet F , and encodes this message as a vector X =[
X1 · · · Xn
]T
, Xi ∈ F . This vector is transmitted
over a noiseless channel and received by the destina-
tion. The wiretapper has access to µ symbols of X ,
represented as the vector W = (Xi, i ∈ I), where
I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. The goal of the system is for the source
to communicate the message to the destination in such
a way that the wiretapper cannot obtain any information
about S from any possible set of µ intercepted symbols.
More precisely, the conditions for secure communication
are
H(S|X) = 0 (1)
H(S|W ) = H(S), ∀I : |I| = µ. (2)
Condition (1) implies that S must be a deterministic
function of X . The question is then how to design a
(probabilistic) encoding of S into X such that conditions
(1) and (2) are satisfied.
Note that, by expanding H(S,X |W ), we have
H(S|W ) = H(S|X,W )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+H(X |W )−H(X |S,W )
= H(X |W )−H(X |S,W ) (3)
≤ H(X |W ) ≤ n− µ
so the maximum number of symbols that can be securely
communicated is upper bounded by H(S) ≤ n− µ.
This maximum rate can be achieved by using Ozarow-
Wyner coset coding scheme [8], which operates as
follows. Assume F is a finite field of sufficiently large
cardinality. Let k = n − µ and let C be an (n, µ)
linear MDS code over F with parity-check matrix H .
Encoding is performed by randomly choosing some
X ∈ C such that S = HX ; in other words, each message
is viewed as a syndrome specifying a coset of C, and
the transmitted vector is chosen uniformly at random
among the elements of that coset. Upon reception of
X , decoding is performed by simply computing the
syndrome S = HX .
With respect to security, it is immediate that condition
(1) is satisfied in this scheme. Since C is a linear code,
the probabilistic encoding ensures that H(X) = H(S)+
µ, and thus H(X |W ) = H(X)−H(W ) = H(S)+µ−
H(W ) ≥ H(S). On the other hand, since C is an MDS
code, knowledge of S and W is sufficient to determine
X , so H(X |S,W ) = 0. These two facts applied in (3)
imply that condition (2) is satisfied, and therefore secure
communication can be achieved.
B. Wiretap Networks
Consider a communication network represented by a
directed multigraph with unit capacity edges, a single
source node and multiple destination nodes. The source
node produces a message X =
[
X1 · · · Xn
]T
con-
sisting of symbols from an alphabet F , and this message
is requested by each of the destination nodes. Each link
in the network is assumed to transport a symbol in F
free of errors. When network coding is used, each node
in the network produces symbols to be transmitted by
performing arbitrary operations on the received symbols
(or on the message symbols in the case of the source
node). We say that the network code is feasible (and
multicast communication is achieved) if each destination
node is able to recover the source message.
Let Fq be a finite field and assume that F is a
vector space over Fq . In this case, an element of F may
also be called a packet. When linear network coding is
used, each packet transmitted by a node is an Fq-linear
combination of received (or message) packets. Let C be
the minimum value of the mincut from the source node
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to any destination node. It is a well-known result that a
feasible linear network code exists if n ≤ C and q is
sufficiently large, but no feasible network code exists if
n > C [1]–[3].
The wiretap problem of Section II-A can be gener-
alized to the network scenario above by introducing a
wiretapper who can eavesdrop on µ links, represented
by the set I, and by assuming that the source message
is given by S =
[
S1 S2 · · · Sk
]T
, Si ∈ F , which is
then encoded into X for transmission over the network.
We assume that linear network coding is used, so the
packets observed by the wiretapper can be represented as
a vector W = BX , where B is an µ×n matrix over Fq
consisting of the global coding vectors associated with
the edges in I.
Assume that n ≤ C, q is sufficiently large, and that a
feasible network code is selected, i.e., each destination
node is able to recover X . The conditions for secure
communication remain the same as before, namely
H(S|X) = 0 (4)
H(S|W ) = H(S), ∀I : |I| = µ. (5)
The question is then how to design an encoding from S
to X and a feasible linear network code such that (4)
and (5) are satisfied.
Considering F = Fq, Rouayheb and Soljanin showed
in [6] that secure communication is possible using the
coset coding scheme of Sec. II-A if the network code is
chosen to satisfy certain constraints. The development is
similar to that of Sec. II-A, where we choose k = n−µ
and let H be the parity-check matrix of an (n, µ) linear
MDS code over F . Equations (4) and H(X |W ) ≥ H(S)
are automatically satisfied by coset encoding, but to
satisfy H(X |S,W ) = 0 we must ensure that the matrix[
H
B
]
is nonsingular for all I such that B is full-rank.
(Note that the case where B is not full-rank reduces to
a similar instance with a full-rank B and a smaller µ.)
This condition is equivalent to constraining the network
code such that no linear combination of µ = n − k or
fewer coding vectors belongs to the space spanned by
the rows of H .
It follows from this result that secure multicast com-
munication can be achieved in two steps: first, designing
a coset coding scheme based on an MDS code, and then
designing a linear network code so as to satisfy the above
constraint.
In the following, we show that this undesirable cou-
pling between the coset coding scheme and the network
code design can be avoided.
III. RANK-METRIC CODES FOR WIRETAP
NETWORKS
A. Rank-Metric Codes
We first present a brief review of rank-metric codes.
Let Fn×mq be the set of all n ×m matrices over Fq.
A natural distance measure between elements X and Y
of Fn×mq is given by the rank distance dR(X,Y ) ,
rank(Y −X). As observed in [9], the rank distance is
indeed a metric.
A rank-metric code is a nonempty subset of Fn×mq
used in the context of the rank metric. The minimum
rank distance of a rank-metric code is the minimum
rank distance among all pairs of distinct codewords. The
Singleton bound for the rank metric (see [12], [14] and
references therein) states that every rank-metric code
C ⊆ Fn×mq with minimum rank distance d must satisfy
logq |C| ≤ max{n,m}(min{n,m} − d+ 1).
Codes that achieve this bound are called maximum-rank-
distance (MRD) codes.
The usual way to construct rank-metric codes is via
the correspondence between F1×mq and an extension field
Fqm . By fixing a basis for Fqm as an m-dimensional
vector space over Fq, any element of Fqm can be
regarded as a row vector of length m over Fq and,
similarly, any column vector of length n over Fqm can be
regarded as an n×m matrix over Fq. The rank of a vector
X ∈ Fnqm is the rank of X as an n×m matrix over Fq,
and the same applies for the rank distance. Under this
correspondence, a rank-metric code in Fn×mq is simply
a block code of length n over Fqm used in the context
of the rank metric.
It is useful to consider linear (n, k) codes over Fqm
with minimum rank distance d. For such codes, the
Singleton bound becomes
d ≤ min
{
1,
m
n
}
(n− k) + 1.
Note that the classical Singleton bound d ≤ n − k + 1
can be achieved only when n ≤ m. For this case, a class
of MRD codes with any specified k was described in [9]
by Gabidulin.
We now restate some results from [9] which relate the
minimum rank distance of a linear code with properties
of its parity-check matrix. To avoid confusion, the rank
of a matrix H over Fqm is denoted by rankqm H .
Theorem 1: Let C be a linear (n, k) code over Fqm
with parity-check matrix H . Then C has minimum rank
distance d if and only if
rankqm HT = d− 1
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for any full-rank matrix T ∈ Fn×(d−1)q and
rank qm HT0 < d
for some full-rank matrix T0 ∈ Fn×dq .
Corollary 2: Assume n ≤ m. A linear (n, k) code
over Fqm with parity-check matrix H is an MRD code
if and only if
rankqm HT = n− k
for any full-rank matrix T ∈ Fn×(n−k)q .
B. A Universal Coding Scheme for Wiretap Networks
We now present our solution to the wiretap problem
of Section II-B. Following [6], we use a coset coding
scheme similar to that of Section II-A; however, we set
the symbol alphabet to be F = Fqm , while the field for
the linear network coding operations remains Fq . Note
that, since coset encoding/decoding is performed only
at source/destination nodes, setting F to be an extension
field of Fq does not interfere with the underlying network
code.
Let k = n− µ and let H be the parity-check matrix
of a linear (n, µ) code over F . Encoding and decoding
of the source message S is performed as described in
Section II-A. With respect to security, Rouayheb and
Soljanin’s analysis carries out unchanged, and we arrive
at the same security condition: the matrix
[
H
B
]
must be
nonsingular for all I such that B ∈ Fµ×nq is full-rank.
Note that, while H is defined over F = Fqm , the matrix
B has only entries in Fq . This fact is the fundamental
distinction of our approach and will allow us to satisfy
the security condition regardless of the network code
used.
Our main result is a consequence of the following
lemma.
Lemma 3: Let H be the parity-check matrix of a
linear MRD (n, µ) code over Fqm . For any full-rank
matrix B ∈ Fµ×nq , the n× n matrix
M =
[
H
B
]
is nonsingular over Fqm .
Proof: Consider the system of equations[
H
B
]
X = 0
in the unknown X ∈ Fnqm . We will show that X = 0
is the only solution to this system, which implies that
rankqm M = n.
First, choose some (n−µ)×n matrix D over Fq such
that
[
B
D
]
is nonsingular, and let X˜ = DX . We have that
[
B
D
]
X =
[
0
X˜
]
=⇒ X =
[
B
D
]
−1 [
0
X˜
]
.
Moreover, if T is the (full-rank) matrix corresponding to
the last n− µ columns of
[
B
D
]
−1
, then X = T X˜ .
Now, 0 = HX = HTX˜. By Corollary 2, the (n −
µ)× (n−µ) matrix HT is nonsingular over Fqm . Thus,
we must have X˜ = 0 and hence X = 0.
The following theorem summarizes the results of this
section.
Theorem 4: Consider a multicast communication net-
work that transports n packets of length m ≥ n over
Fq, subject to the presence of a wiretapper who can
eavesdrop on at most µ links. The maximum number
of source packets that can be securely communicated
to each destination, in such a way that the wiretapper
obtains no information about the source packets, is n−µ.
This rate can be achieved by using any feasible Fq-linear
network code in conjunction with a fixed end-to-end
coset coding scheme based on any linear MRD (n, µ)
code over Fqm .
The following example illustrates the above results.
Example 1: Let q = 2, m = n = 3, µ = 2 and
k = n− µ = 1. Let F = F23 be generated by a root of
p(x) = x3+x+1, which we denote by α. According to
[9], one possible (n, µ) MRD code over Fqm has parity-
check matrix H =
[
1 α α2
]
.
To form X , we can choose X2, X3 ∈ Fqm uniformly
at random and set X1 to satisfy
S = HX = X1 + αX2 + α
2X3.
Note that X can be transmitted over any network that
uses a feasible linear network code. The specific network
code used is irrelevant as long as each destination node
is able to recover X .
Now, suppose that the wiretapper intercepts W =
BX , where
B =
[
1 0 1
0 1 1
]
.
Then
W = B

X1X2
X3

 =
[
1 0 1
0 1 1
]S + αX2 + α
2X3
X2
X3


=
[
1
0
]
S +
[
α 1 + α2
1 1
] [
X2
X3
]
.
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This is a linear system with 3 variables and 2 equa-
tions over Fqm . Note that, given S, there is exactly
one solution for (X2, X3) for each value of W . Thus,
Pr(W |S) = 1/82, ∀S,W , from which follows that S
and W are independent.
IV. DISCUSSION
Theorem 4 shows that the problem of ensuring com-
munication security against a wiretapper can be treated
independently from that of multicasting information, in
effect turning network coding design back into a much
easier and already satisfactorily solved problem [15]. A
byproduct of this result is that, to incorporate security,
we no longer need to enlarge the field of network
coding operations more than what is strictly required
for multicasting—although the network does need to
transport packets of size larger than a single element. In
practice, packet lengths are much larger than n, at least
10 times larger for typical parameters, so the constraint
m ≥ n is not really a concern.
As pointed out in the previous section, encoding and
decoding of the source message require operations to be
performed in the extension field Fqm . We mention that
each encoding or decoding procedure can be performed
in O(k(n − k)) operations in Fqm by using a parity-
check matrix H in systematic form. More precisely, if
H =
[
I P
]
and XT =
[
XTS X
T
R
]
, where XS has
k rows, then S = HX = XS + PXR, so S can be
encoded by randomly generating XR and then setting
XS = S − PXR. Encoding thus amounts essentially
to a matrix multiplication over Fqm . Decoding can be
performed similarly.
It is worth to mention that our security scheme can be
seamlessly integrated with random network coding. We
simply require that each packet transports a header of
length n containing the global coding vector associated
with the packet; thus, the total packet length must be at
least n +m symbols in Fq. Note that, since a random
linear network code is feasible with high probability, the
only parameter pertaining to the network that we need
to estimate is the effective mincut C, in order to decide
on n, k and the coset coding scheme.
V. CONCLUSION
We consider the problem of providing information-
theoretic security in a communication network subject
to the presence of a wiretapper. We propose a coset
coding scheme similar to that of Ozarow-Wyner, but
defined over the extension field Fqm . For this reason,
we assume that packets of length m are transmitted
rather than individual symbols. We show that transmis-
sion at the maximum possible rate (the network secure
capacity) is possible irrespectively of the underlying
network code. As a consequence, the sub-problems of
information transport and information security can be
treated independently of each other: a feasible linear
network code can be designed (perhaps, randomly) with
only throughput in mind, while a fixed outer code can
be used to provide security whenever it is needed. Our
proposed scheme is based on MRD codes and can be
efficiently encoded and decoded.
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